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Abstract
International wage diﬀerences −driven by international technology or factor endowment diﬀerences−
encourage the ﬂow of Foreign Direct Investment from high- to low-wage countries. However, the access of
high-technology ﬁrms may drive domestic wages up, dampening the incentives for FDI ﬂows. A general-
equilibrium model that emphasizes the joint determination of FDI ﬂows and labor market outcomes yield
several conclusions. First, an equilibrium with positive FDI inﬂo w sa n dw a g e sa b o v ea u t a r k yl e v e l si s
more likely in large labor-abundant technology-backward countries or when the ﬁxed cost of foreign
investment is low. Second, the conditions that depress autarky wages −technology diﬀerences and labor
abundance− are those than enhance the equilibrium wage rate when FDI takes place. Third, FDI rises
the relative cost of labor in the host economy, shifting the domestic production structure toward a more
capital-intensive mix. Finally, the sectoral distribution of FDI ﬂows does not depend upon diﬀerences in
factor intensities, and it is solely determined by sectoral diﬀerences in the ﬁx e dc o s to ff o r e i g ni n v e s t m e n t .
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1"Low wages and high tech [in China]. Combine the two and America has a problem."
Business Week, Dec 6, 2004
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The explosion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in last decades has given rise to a broad literature on the
determinants of multinationals. Because most FDI ﬂows are between developed countries and of horizontal
type1 −ﬁrms that produce the same goods in diﬀerent locations−, the literature has focused on the role of size,
distance and trade costs (tariﬀs) on FDI ﬂows in the context of the knowledge-capital model, that emphasizes
the ﬂow of knowledge rather than capital as the key component of FDI (Markusen, 2002; Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple, 2004). Under the premise that ﬁrms incur in signiﬁcant costs of installing production facilities
abroad, multinationals must have oﬀsetting advantages, usually associated with some forms of knowledge
capital. In such context, horizontal multinationals are more likely when transport cost or tariﬀsa r eh i g h ,
meaning that there are advantages of avoiding those transport costs and locate close to consumption centers.
Also, horizontal FDI is more probable when the host country is large because the potential gains from
economies of scale more than compensate the ﬁxed cost of foreign production.
Because international factor price diﬀerences encourage the whole movement of production processes
toward one location (the low-wage country), models of horizontal FDI usually assume international factor
price equalization. The role of wage diﬀerences is emphasized in models of vertical FDI, where the production
process is fragmented; headquarters can be located in one country and production facilities in another
(Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002). Assuming that these two components of the production process have
diﬀerent factor intensities, factor price diﬀerences encourage the location of headquarters in the country with
lowest price of the factor used intensively in headquarters services, e.g., high-skilled labor, while unskilled-
labor-intensive production facilities are located in the low-skilled-labor abundant country or in the largest
1Brainard (1997) tests for the importance of factor price diﬀerences as an explanation for FDI, dismissing it in favor of
explanations based on trade costs and size. This is the fundamental empirical support for models of horizontal FDI.
2country, if trade costs exist (Markusen, 2002).
In Helpman’s model, cross-country diﬀerences in factor endowments lead to cross-country diﬀerences
in factor prices, generating room for multinationals to emerge in order to enjoy cost diﬀerences. Unless
cross-country diﬀerences in factor endowments are too large −in which case there is no multinational activity
in equilibrium and factor price diﬀerences remain−, foreign ﬁrms’ investment leads to international factor
price equalization. Moreover, the possibility of vertical multinationals enlarges the factor endowment set
consistent with factor price equalization. Other papers have focused on the eﬀects of multinationals and
outsourcing on relative factor prices in home and host countries. In Markusen (2002), as in Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a,b, 1997), the fragmentation of production processes raises the real wage of skilled labor both in
the source and host countries. This is because production fragmentation in the source country raises relative
demand for skilled labor, as part of the unskilled-labor-intensive production process is done abroad. In the
host country, there is also a rise in relative demand for skilled labor because it is assumed that production
in the increasing-returns sector is more skilled intensive than production of the constant-returns-to-scale
product.2
This paper oﬀers an alternative approach to study the labor market implications of FDI ﬂows. In
particular, it highlights the joint determination of FDI ﬂows and factor market outcomes: while FDI ﬂows
respond to international diﬀerences in factor prices, these are simultaneously aﬀected by the level and
composition of foreign investment. In the context of a perfectly competitive two-sector two-factor model
where factor price diﬀerences arise from international technological diﬀerences (Treﬂer, 1993), I analyze the
role of wage diﬀerences on attracting FDI −deﬁned as foreign capital embedded with the foreign advanced
technology3− from high- to low-wage countries, as well as the eﬀects that the access of technology-advanced
2These results are not inconsistent with those of Helpman (1984) because they are based on diﬀerent assumptions regarding
factor intensities of headquarters, production plants of the increasing returns good and production of the homogeneous product
(Feenstra, 2004).
3This setting is similar to Mundell’s (1957) analysis of capital ﬂows in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. However, in this
paper domestic and foreign capital are not perfect substitutes because foreign capital is embedded with the foreign advanced
technology. This is a fundamental distinction because equalization of domestic and foreign capital returns is not a necessary
3foreign ﬁrms have on the labor market of technology-backward countries.
The model stresses two main equilibrium forces. On the one hand, international wage diﬀerences
encourage foreign investment ﬂows in search of low labor costs in order to obtain a higher return to capital.
This cost advantage for foreign ﬁrms is however compensated by a ﬁxed cost of producing abroad. In
equilibrium, the return to capital of foreign-invested ﬁrms producing in the domestic economy must be
equal to the international rental rate, that is the capital return of foreign ﬁrms producing in their source
economies. The presence of a ﬁxed cost of foreign production introduces increasing-return-to-scale features
to foreign investment in an otherwise constant-return-to-scale world. Because of decreasing average costs,
the incentives for foreign producers to bring capital and advanced technology to the low-wage country are
unlimited, unless domestic wages respond to labor market pressures from foreign ﬁrms’ presence. For any
level of domestic wages there is a minimum scale of foreign ﬁrms’ domestic production −and employment−
that compensates ﬁxed investment costs and make foreign production viable. This relationship represents
foreign ﬁrms’ demand for domestic labor.
The second equilibrium relationship is the residual supply of domestic labor available for foreign produc-
tion. For any domestic wage rate there is an employment level of domestic ﬁrms consistent with equilibrium
in the domestic capital market, which remains segmented from the international market. The diﬀerence
between total labor supply and domestic ﬁrms’ employment is available for foreign production, and it is
an increasing function of the domestic wage rate. As long as foreign ﬁrms’ presence bid domestic wages
up marginally from their autarky level, domestic ﬁrms specialize in the production of the capital-intensive
good. The higher relative cost of labor induces domestic ﬁrms to choose a more capital-intensive technique,
lowering domestic labor requirements.
It turns that under certain conditions the equilibrium is characterized by no foreign investment and no
labor market eﬀects. This is the case when the minimum scale of foreign production that compensates the
ﬁxed cost of foreign production is greater than the residual labor supply at any wage rate. This is more likely
if the international technology gap is small, if the technology-backward country is small or capital-abundant
equilibrium condition.
4or if the ﬁxed cost of foreign production is high enough. Contrary to Helpman (1984), an equilibrium with
FDI is more likely when autarky factor price diﬀerences are high. Otherwise, there is an equilibrium with
positive FDI and domestic wages above their autarky level.
Several elements characterize this equilibrium. First, wage pressures are greater in large labor-abundant
technology-backward countries, as they are able to provide foreign producers a greater scale of production.
Domestic wages end up being higher in those countries that allow foreign ﬁrms to enjoy more economies of
scale. Interestingly, the conditions that depress income per capita in the pre-integration equilibrium are the
same that enhance the wage and income gains in the low-wage host country when FDI ﬂows are allowed for.
Also, the rise in the relative cost of labor for domestic producers shift the production pattern toward a more
capital-intensive mix, and this eﬀect is greater in large labor-abundant countries.
Second, contrary to partial equilibrium thinking −where wage diﬀerences beneﬁtm o r eﬁrms in labor-
intensive industries, and hence foreign investment is larger in industries that use intensively the factor that is
relatively cheaper in the host economy−, FDI will take place in the industry with lower ﬁxed costs regardless
on its factor intensity. Although wage diﬀerences beneﬁt more foreign producers in labor-intensive industries,
foreign ﬁrms in the domestic economy in capital-intensive industries are able to produce much more income
with the same employment level, generating more resources to pay for the ﬁxed cost. In general equilibrium
these two forces compensate each other, and the sectoral distribution of FDI ﬂows depends uniquely on the
ﬁxed cost of foreign production.
Third, welfare for domestic residents is always higher in the equilibrium with FDI. This is because the
domestic economy is labor abundant relative to the factor intensity of the capital-intensive sector, that is
the industry in which the domestic economy unambiguously specialize following a rise in wages beyond their
autarky level. This implies that domestic residents are beneﬁted from a rise in the relative cost of labor.
However, the welfare eﬀect of FDI ﬂows on source countries is ambiguous.
Finally, I extend the analysis to the case where international factor price diﬀerences respond not only to
technology diﬀerences but also to diﬀerences in factor endowments, so that in the pre-integration equilibrium
the domestic economy is specialized in the production of the labor-intensive good. The main conclusions
5aforementioned hold, although the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. In particular, under certain
conditions there is a low-wage low-FDI equilibrium, where the domestic economy remains specialized in
the labor-intensive good, and a high-wage high-FDI equilibrium in which the domestic economy specializes
in the production of the capital-intensive product. In both cases, domestic wages are higher than their
pre-integration level.
Before proceeding, some words are required to insert this paper in the literature of vertical and horizontal
multinationals. First, this paper is not about multinationals but rather foreign investment. Because of
the constant-returns-to-scale framework, we are not able to distinguish between ﬁrms and industries. FDI
refers to capital and technology ﬂowing from one country to another, and the model is silent regarding the
identity of foreign producers, as the ownership of each unit of foreign capital is immaterial for the results.
Second, this paper rules out vertical FDI −conceived as headquarters in one country and production facilities
in another− because the production of the ﬁnal good requires labor and capital only. Indeed, the goods
produced by foreign ﬁrms in the domestic economy are the same as those produced in their source country,
meaning that the paper implicitly takes a horizontal view of FDI. Although the size of the host country
is a fundamental determinant of FDI in this paper −as it is for horizontal multinationals in general−,F D I
arises in response to international diﬀerences in factor prices. This is a fundamental diﬀerence with the
horizontal-multinational literature, which emphasizes that cost diﬀerences encourage the complete movement
of production facilities to the low-cost country. By endogenizing the labor market eﬀects of foreign ﬁrms’
activity, this paper allows the coexistence of horizontal FDI activities and factor price diﬀerences.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the model. It ﬁrst discusses the
pre-integration equilibrium when FDI is banned, and it then analyzes the eﬀects of allowing international
movements of capital and technology. In the ﬁr s tp a r tIﬁrst focus on the case where there is production
diversiﬁcation in the pre-integration equilibrium, so that factor price diﬀerences are only determined by
cross-country technology diﬀerences. The second part allows for production specialization and hence it
provides a role for factor endowment diﬀerences in explaining initial wage diﬀerences. Section 3 concludes.
62 The Model
2.1 Segmented Factor Markets
Consider a small economy that produces the only two goods available: x and y.4 Both goods are produced
with CRS production functions and two factors: labor L and capital K, which are internationally immobile.
Sector x is capital-intensive, and relative factor endowment k =( K/L) is such that both goods are produced.
The zero-proﬁt conditions for domestic producers in each industry are
p∗
x = aLxw + aKxr
p∗
y = aLyw + aKyr (1)
where p∗
i is the international product price of good i = x,y; w and r refer to the domestic return per unit
of labor and capital respectively, and aFi = aFi(w/r) represent factor requirements per unit of output, that
depend on technology parameters and relative factor prices. Both zero-proﬁt conditions jointly determine
domestic factor prices and factor intensities. Production levels of x and y follow from imposing factor
market clearing conditions given equilibrium factor usage.5
Consider that the domestic country is technology-backward with respect to a foreign country where
product prices are set, meaning that after correcting for diﬀerences in relative factor prices, there are cross-
country diﬀerences in average factor productivity. Analytically, international diﬀerences in average factor








=( 1 + δ) · ki (ω) (2)
where δ ≥ 0 measures a Hicks-neutral technology gap between the domestic and foreign countries (com-
4It is straightforward to extend the analysis to a multi-good multi-cone framework, and none of the results is altered. More
on this below.
5The two conditions in equation (1) determine w and r. This is an equilibrium as long as kx(w/r) > k>k y(w/r) where
kx(w/r)=aKx/aLx and ky(w/r)=aKy/aLy.
7mon across sectors), and li (ω) and ki (ω) measure the eﬀect of relative factor price ratios ω =( w/r)/(w∗/r∗)
on average factor productivity, with li (1) = ki (1) = 1 and ∂li (ω)/∂ω < 0 and ∂ki (ω)/∂ω > 0. In equilib-
rium, because both countries face the same world product prices and Total Factor Productivity diﬀerences








Assuming identical and homothetic preferences across countries, the trade pattern implicit in this equilib-
rium is that predicted of the traditional two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model. Because productivity diﬀerences
are similar across industries, the production pattern is uniquely determined by cross-country diﬀerences in
factor endowments. Therefore, capital-abundant countries export the capital-intensive good while the op-
posite happens in labor-abundant countries.
2.2 Capital and Technology Flows
Factor price diﬀerences generate incentives for foreign producers to move capital and technology to the low-
wage domestic economy in order to enjoy low labor costs. In particular, I consider that each unit of foreign
capital is embedded with the foreign advanced technology. Despite the domestic return to capital is lower
than the foreign return r∗, foreign units of capital in the domestic economy can obtain a capital return
higher than r∗. Foreign ﬁrms however only have access to the domestic labor market, while the domestic
capital market remains segmented. The rationale for this assumption is twofold. First, the assumption
that technology is embodied in capital suggests that domestic and foreign capital are not perfect substitutes,
as units of domestic capital cannot be employed with the advanced technology. This means that the return
to domestic capital is endogenously determined. Second, if technology-advanced ﬁrms have access to all
domestic factor markets, there is no room for domestic ﬁrms. To rule out this case we have to assume that
some factors remain segmented from international competition; capital in this case.
The attractiveness of low domestic wages for technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms is however compensated
with a ﬁxed cost Fi of producing in a foreign country, meaning that foreign production in industry i in the















output of the foreign producer in the host country in industry i, where K∗
i is the amount of foreign capital
in domestic industry i.6 As long as (4) holds with inequality there are incentives to bring as much capital as
possible to enjoy decreasing average costs. This would be the case if the access of foreign ﬁrms to domestic
labor markets does not pressure the domestic wage rate up (Findlay, 1978), meaning that prices are always
higher than average costs, and hence the return to capital of foreign investment is higher than r∗.7
An equilibrium condition where the marginal unit of foreign capital is indiﬀerent between producing in
its home country or moving to the low-wage country means that (4) must hold with equality. This condition
determines a relationship between the domestic wage rate w and foreign employment in industry iL ∗
i:
L∗
i = f(w), which deﬁnes the minimum amount of foreign ﬁrms’ employment L∗
i−and hence production−
that is compatible with the zero proﬁt condition at any level of w. The employment level in industry i by






















After accounting for diﬀerences in foreign ﬁrms’ average factor productivity due to diﬀerences in relative


















This equality −that implicitly deﬁnes f(w)− h o l d si fe i t h e ro ft h et e r m si nb r a c k e t si se q u a lt oz e r o . T h e
ﬁrst term in the right-hand-side of (6) cannot be zero for that requires w>w ∗,m e a n i n gt h a tf o r e i g nﬁrms
6I assume the foreign economy is large enough so that capital outﬂo w si m b e d d e di nF D Iﬂows do not alter factor prices in
the foreign economy.
7This is, for example, the case if there is a totally elastic domestic labor supply.
8Along an isoquant of a constant-return-to-scale production function it is possible to show that d aLi = −θKiσi (b w − b r)
and d aKi = θLiσi (b w − b r) where b x = dx/x and σi is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Therefore,
a∗
Li(w/r∗)=a∗
Li(w∗/r∗)·[1 − θKiσi (w/w∗ − 1)]. Similar for a∗
Ki(w/r∗). Replacing these expressions into (5) we obtain (6).
9push the domestic wage rate beyond its level in the foreign country. This is not equilibrium because it requires
that the zero-proﬁt condition in industry i does not hold in the domestic and foreign countries simultaneously.
The assumption that the foreign country is large enough means that for any size of foreign capital ﬂows, the
source country relative factor endowment remains within the cone of production diversiﬁcation, and w∗ and
r∗ are not aﬀected, assuring that both zero-proﬁt conditions hold. Also, if θ
∗
Kiσi (w/w∗ − 1) = 1 it means
that foreign ﬁrms producing in the domestic economy choose a capital-labor ratio such that average labor
productivity is inﬁnity.9 This is not reasonable.
Therefore, foreign ﬁrms’ demand for domestic labor satisﬁes





Equation (7) represents the minimum level of employment by foreign ﬁrms consistent with any domestic
wage rate w. We should ﬁrst notice that ∂L∗
i/∂w > 0 and ∂2L∗
i/∂w2 > 0, meaning that the higher the
domestic wage rate the higher the employment level by foreign ﬁrms consistent with zero-proﬁts, and this
eﬀect is increasing on w. The intuition behind (7) is simple: a raise in domestic wages shrinks the cost
advantage for foreign producers, and hence equilibrium requires a greater scale of foreign ﬁrms to move along
the average cost curve. This is attained with a higher level of foreign ﬁrms’ domestic employment L∗
i.
Three elements are worth emphasizing from (7). First, notice that for a given level of employment, foreign
ﬁrms are able to bid wages up more in those industries with lower ﬁxed costs, regardless of whether they are
labor or capital intensive. This result runs against the intuition that ﬁrms in labor-intensive industries are
more beneﬁted from lower wages −through a greater impact on the capital return−, and hence that we should
expect greater ﬂows of foreign investment in labor-intensive industries if wage diﬀerences are the driving force
encouraging FDI. However, one unit of labor in a foreign ﬁrms in industry i produces 1/a∗
Li units of good i
and money income of pi/a∗
Li = w∗/θ
∗






Kiσi (w/w∗ − 1)
¢
. I ft h i se x p r e s s i o ni se q u a lt oz e r oa v e r a g el a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t y
of foreign ﬁrms producing in the domestic economy is ∞.
10Assuming a Leontief production function (that is immaterial for the analysis), the zero proﬁt condition for foreign producers



















10can obtain more value of domestic employment than ﬁrms in labor-intensive sectors, so they can pay higher
wages. In general equilibrium these two eﬀects cancel each other out, and competition for domestic labor
concentrates FDI in the industry in which foreign ﬁrms’ impact on domestic wages is greatest, that is the
industry with lowest Fi. This is a corollary of decreasing average costs of foreign production; it is optimal
to concentrate FDI in one industry.
Second, because w never reaches w∗ (for Fi > 0), the wage-rental ratio faced by foreign ﬁrms in the
domestic country is lower than in the source country, meaning that foreign invested enterprises choose a more
labor-intensive production technique than in their source economies. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence presented by Lipsey and others.11 Third, if Fi =0 , there is international wage equalization (f (w)
is vertical at w = w∗), and there are inﬁnite levels of foreign investment consistent with foreign ﬁrms’ zero
proﬁt condition. This does not mean that the equilibrium is undetermined, as becomes clear below.
Figure 1 depicts L∗
i = fi(w) for industries with diﬀerent levels of Fi,w h e r efi(0) = F/w∗ > 0; fi(wa)=
(1+δ)/δ ·fi(0) and limw→w∗ fi(w)=∞. The relevant curve in equilibrium is the rightists, that is, the one
for the industry with lowest Fi.
[Insert Figure 1]
The second equilibrium relationship follows from identifying the residual domestic labor supply available
for foreign ﬁrms −as a function of domestic wages− consistent with domestic capital market clearing. By
assuming that domestic capital is internationally immobile, the domestic capital market clearing condition
determines domestic ﬁrms’ employment, and the residual labor supply for foreign ﬁr m si st h ed i ﬀerence
between total labor supply and domestic ﬁrms’ employment. In other words, the size of foreign investment
The term in brackets in the right-hand-side reveals that ﬁrms in labor-intensive industries (high−θ∗
Li) are more beneﬁted with
w/w∗ < 1 as they can reduce unitary costs by more. The second term is the ratio of money ﬁx e dc o s t so ff o r e i g np r o d u c t i o n
and money income that L∗
i units of labor in industry i can generate for foreign producers. This gives an advantage to foreign
ﬁrms in capital-intensive industries, that can generate more money income with the same employment level than ﬁrms in
labor-intensive industries. Equation (7) can be derived from manipulating this expression.
11Lipsey, Kravis and Roldan (1982) and Kravis and Lipsey (1988). See also Lipsey (2002).
11and employment is limited by the level of domestic employment consistent with equilibrium in the domestic
capital market.
The level of domestic employment consistent with capital market equilibrium depends upon whether
w>w a or w = wa.12 Consider ﬁrst that w>w a. If the access of foreign ﬁrms to the domestic labor
market rises wages beyond wa the labor-intensive domestic industry becomes non-competitive. Because
the domestic capital market remains segmented from international markets −and hence the domestic return
to capital is endogenously determined−, the rise in domestic wages pressures r down, rendering the labor-
intensive industry uncompetitive. Specialization in the capital-intensive industry determines the level of
domestic ﬁrms’ employment based upon the factor intensity of industry x at domestic relative factor prices.










L − L∗ (8)
where r is the endogenously-determined return to domestic capital −consistent with the zero-proﬁtc o n -
dition for domestic producers in the capital-intensive industry px = aLx(w/r)w + aKx(w/r)r−, K and L
represent domestic capital and labor endowments, and L∗ is the employment level available for foreign ﬁrms.
Using the deﬁnition of changes in average factor productivity for changes in relative factor prices −see


























x is the pre-integration domestic capital-labor ratio in industry x (equal to k∗
x), σ is the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital in industry x and r is the post-integration domestic return to









h(w∗) < ∞. After some algebra manipulation we get13




kxθKxw > 0 and
∂2h(w)












A higher domestic wage rate w −and hence w/r− pushes industry x toward a more capital-intensive
technique. Given K, employment of domestic ﬁrms falls and hence domestic labor available for foreign
producers increases. If σ =0−Leontief production function−, the right-hand-side of (9) is equal to 1, and
the level of L∗ that assures domestic capital market equilibrium is L∗ = h(wa), that does not depend upon
w.
Figure 2 depicts h(w). Its position depends upon L, k and δ. The amount of labor available for foreign
producers at any level of w increases with L (∂h(w)/∂L>0) and it decreases with relative capital-abundance
k (∂h(w)/∂k<0). The intuition in both cases is the same: the larger or the more labor-abundant the
domestic country is, the greater the labor force available for foreign ﬁrms at any w.A l s o , h(w) depends
positively on δ (∂h(w)/∂δ > 0). For any level of w,t h eg r e a t e rδ the lower the domestic return to capital,
which implies a higher wage-rental ratio faced by domestic ﬁrms. As a consequence, domestic ﬁrms choose
a more capital-intensive production technique in the capital-intensive industry and release more labor for
foreign production. Finally, h(w∗) < L meaning that the upper limit for w is w∗.
[Insert Figure 2]
The vertical segment of h(w) at w = wa follows from noticing that there is a range of aggregate em-
ployment by domestic ﬁrms consistent with positive domestic production of x and y and capital market
equilibrium. With production diversiﬁcation of domestic ﬁrms capital market clearing is possible as long as
relative factor usage by domestic ﬁrms satisﬁes ka
y ≤ K/(L−L∗) ≤ ka
x. This condition implicitly determines
the residual supply of labor for foreign ﬁrms consistent with domestic diversiﬁcation.
The equilibrium in the domestic labor market is therefore reached when h(w)=f(w),s u b j e c tt ow ≥ wa.
If h(w) and f(w) do not intersect each other, as in panel (a) in Figure 3, there in no equilibrium with FDI
and the domestic wage rate is wa. Conceptually, the domestic economy is not able to provide a level
of employment (and scale) to foreign ﬁrms that compensates the ﬁxed cost of foreign production. This
13equilibrium takes place under three conditions: (a) if the ﬁxed cost of foreign investment is high enough
(high min(Fi)), (b) if the domestic economy is small and/or too capital abundant (low L and high k), and
(c) if the technology disadvantage of the (potential) host country is small (low δ).14
[Insert Figure 3,p a n e l s(a) and (b)]
Panel (b) presents a case in which equilibria with positive FDI arises.15 There are two possible equilibria:
a low-wage low-FDI one and a high-wage high-FDI equilibrium. In both cases the domestic economy
specializes in the production of the capital-intensive good x and the equilibrium domestic wage rate is
higher than wa. However, it is possible to see that the low-wage low-FDI equilibrium is unstable while the
high-wage high-FDI equilibrium is stable. Because f (w) represents the minimum scale (measured in labor
units) required by foreign ﬁrms at any given wage level and h(w) represents the residual employment level
available for foreign producers after imposing domestic capital market integration, the condition for a stable
equilibrium is that ∂f (w)/∂w > ∂h(w)/∂w at f (w)=h(w).I f wA <w<w B, the employment level
of foreign ﬁrms is higher than its minimum required level to compensate the ﬁx e dc o s t ,w h i c hm e a n st h a t
price is higher than average cost. Because foreign ﬁrms have incentives to expand, the domestic wage rate
increases until w = wB. The opposite happens is w<w A or w>w B, in which case the lack of foreign
investment drive domestic wages down. Therefore, I focus the analysis on the only stable equilibrium B.16
Notice that domestic residents are unambiguously better-oﬀ in B compared to their autarky welfare level.
Intuitively, this is because the capital-labor ratio of the capital-intensive good is higher than the capital-
labor endowment of the economy, meaning that domestic residents are beneﬁted with a rise in relative wages.
Algebraically, income per capita is y = w+rk where (w,r) satisfy px = aLxw+aKxr. Totally diﬀerentiating
both expressions yields ∂y/∂w =( ka
x − k)/ka
x that is greater than zero because k<k a
x.






(1 + δ/δ) · Fi/w∗.
15If f(w)=h(w) and ∂f(w)/∂w = ∂h(w)/∂w, there is a unique equilibrium with FDI.
16If f (w) and h(w) are such that A belongs to the vertical segment of h(w), it is also the case that the only stable equilibrium
is the high-wage high-FDI equilibrium with domestic specialization in the capital-intensive sector.
14If the conditions for an equilibrium with FDI are satisﬁed, it is easy to see that domestic wages and
foreign employment are higher the lower the ﬁxed cost of foreign investment. Intuitively, a fall in ﬁxed cost
of foreign investment decreases the minimum scale compatible with foreign production. At the initial wage
rate, foreign ﬁrms want to expand inﬁnitely, which ends up pressuring domestic ﬁrms’ employment down and
domestic wages up. Likewise, a rise in L or a fall in k increases the residual labor supply faced by foreign ﬁrms
at any wage rate. At the initial wage rate foreign ﬁrms are able to expand their production beyond their
minimum required scale, pressuring domestic wages up and absorbing labor from the shrinking domestic
capital-intensive sector, that responds to the rise in labor costs shifting toward a more capital-intensive
production technique. A similar eﬀect has a rise in the technology gap. By shrinking the domestic capital
return, it rises the relative cost of labor for domestic ﬁrms, decreasing domestic employment and enhancing
the expansion of foreign ﬁrms’ production. As a result, domestic wages and foreign employment rise.
These results have important implications. First, notice that a greater technological disadvantage −that
depresses the autarky wage rate− has an enhancing eﬀect on domestic wages when FDI is allowed for. The
likelihood of an equilibrium with FDI is higher in technology-backward countries, and the wage rate in an
equilibrium with FDI is higher in technology-backward countries. This result contrasts with the result in
Helpman (1984), where the likelihood of an equilibrium with multinational ﬁr m sd e c r e a s e sa sa u t a r k yf a c t o r
price diﬀerences rise.
Second, if the conditions for an equilibrium with FDI hold, the rise in the relative cost of labor for
domestic ﬁrms renders domestic producers uncompetitive in the labor-intensive industry, and makes the
economy specialize in the capital-intensive industry. This change in comparative advantage toward capital-
intensive sectors, that is stronger in large labor-abundant technology-backward countries, results from the
assumption that technology is embedded in capital, so the domestic return to capital endogenously adjusts
downward to assure domestic capital market equilibrium. However, we cannot say anything regarding the
overall trade pattern of the host economy because we do not know the sectoral pattern of FDI, but it is
possible that a country that was exporting the labor-intensive good in the pre-integration equilibrium end
up exporting the capital-intensive good after FDI is allowed for.
15In a more general setting, the idea that FDI ﬂows from high− to low−wage countries shift the production
structure of the latter toward more capital-intensive goods may have important welfare consequences on
the former if recipients of FDI are large enough. The worldwide increase in production of capital-intensive
goods can depress terms-of-trade of capital-abundant countries, with a negative welfare eﬀect (see Samuelson,
2004). A more formal conclusion should however take into account the pattern of FDI ﬂows and the change
in production structure toward labor-intensive goods associated with a fall in K/L in source countries of
FDI.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the idea that the ﬁxed cost of foreign investment aﬀects the likelihood
and wage impact of foreign investment raises the question on the role that policies that aﬀect Fi −like
subsidies− c a nh a v eo na t t r a c t i n gF D Ia n de n h a n c i n gt h ew e l f are gains for recipient countries. According
to these results, for certain parameter values a fall in Fi −for example, through subsidies that aﬀect the
net value of Fi as faced by foreign ﬁrms− can have large eﬀects on foreign investment, domestic wages and
welfare.
2.3 Pre-integration Specialization
Up to this point we have assumed that domestic economy’s factor endowment is such that both x and y are
produced when FDI ﬂows are banned. This assumption implies that autarky factor price diﬀerences are
only determined by technology diﬀerences (see (3)), and hence wage pressures from foreign ﬁrms’ penetration
bring the domestic economy toward specialization in the capital-intensive good. In this section I extend the
analysis to allow for factor endowment diﬀerences to aﬀect autarky factor prices. In particular, I focus on
a labor-abundant technology-backward economy that in autarky is specialized in the labor-intensive sector.
Graphically, the initial equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4, where the equilibrium autarky domestic wage
rate wa <w ∗/(1 + δ) is such that k = aKy(wa/ra)/aLy(wa/ra) where wa,r a satisfy p∗
y = aLywa + aKyra.
[Insert Figure 4]
16The international wage gap wa/w∗ −that results both from technology diﬀerences and factor endowment
diﬀerences− encourages the ﬂow of technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms to the domestic economy. Foreign
ﬁrms’ demand for domestic labor is given by (7), but the residual domestic labor supply available for foreign
ﬁrms diﬀers from h(w). This is because the domestic economy may not necessarily specialize in the capital-
intensive sector after foreign production is allowed for. Indeed, for small wage increases beyond wa the
domestic economy will continue specializing in the labor-intensive good. The residual domestic supply of
labor available for foreign ﬁrms L∗ = h0(w) is implicitly deﬁned as
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If wa <w<w ∗/(1+δ) the domestic economy remains specialized in the labor-intensive industry, and L∗
is such that relative factor usage by domestic ﬁrms in industry y assures domestic capital market clearing.
If w = w∗/(1 + δ) both x and y are competitive, and there is a range for L∗ consistent with production
diversiﬁcation and capital market equilibrium. Finally, if w>w ∗/(1+δ), domestic producers in the labor-
intensive industry are rendered uncompetitive and there is specialization in the capital-intensive industry,
as in section 2.2.
Similar conditions to those discussed in section 2.2 determine the likelihood of an equilibrium with positive
FDI. However, an equilibrium with positive FDI is more likely in this case because h0(w) >h (w) for all w,a s
the lower capital-labor endowment of the domestic economy (consistent with pre-integration specialization)
rises the residual labor supply for foreign ﬁrms at any wage rate. This implies that a labor-abundant
country that is specialized in the production of the labor-intensive good in the pre-integration equilibrium
has a higher possibility of attracting FDI than a country that is more capital abundant and that has a higher
autarky wage rate.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 plot two examples in which an equilibrium with FDI exists. In panel (a),
only B is an stable equilibria, and it has the same properties as the one in Figure 3(b). Foreign investment
pressures domestic wages beyond the level consistent with production diversiﬁcation (w∗/(1 + δ)), and
17the economy specializes in the production of the capital-intensive good, meaning that there is a shift in
comparative advantage. As before, foreign ﬁrms’ employment and domestic wages are higher if the ﬁxed
cost of foreign investment is low, if the domestic economy is large or labor-abundant, and if its technology
gap is high.
[Insert Figure 5,p a n e l s(a),(b) and (c)]
In panel (b), there are two stable equilibria, and in both w>w a.17 There is a low-wage low-FDI
equilibrium A −with specialization in the labor-intensive good−, and a high-wage high-FDI equilibrium B
in which the domestic economy is specialized in the production of the capital-intensive good. Although
we cannot predict which equilibrium will actually take place, comparative statics reveal that around each
equilibrium point, domestic wages are higher in large labor-abundant technology-backward countries.
Again, the condition that depress domestic autarky wages −technology diﬀerences and labor abundance−
enhance the likelihood of an equilibrium with FDI and they also rise the wage rate in the case an equilibrium
with FDI takes place. Also, the more labor-abundant a country is the greater its ability to attract foreign
investment. However, in comparison with the case when countries are diversiﬁed in the pre-integration
scenario, the change in the pattern of production and trade is less clear: the domestic economy can remain
specialized in the production of the labor-intensive commodity.
These results are not limited to a two-good world. In a multiple-goods multiple-cones world (see panel
(c) in Figure 5), in which the domestic economy produces one or two labor-intensive goods in the pre-FDI
equilibrium, similar conclusions follow. If the conditions for an equilibrium with positive FDI holds, there
might be one stable equilibrium or two stable equilibria: a low-wage low-FDI equilibrium and a high-wage
high-FDI equilibrium. In the low-wage equilibrium, the domestic economy is specialized in the production of
one labor-intensive commodity while in the high-wage equilibrium domestic ﬁrms produce a capital-intensive
good. Whether the pattern of domestic production changes from its pre-integration equilibrium depends
upon diﬀerences in factor intensities across commodities. With many goods that do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
17In general, the maximum number of equilibria is 4, and at most two of them are stable.
18in their factor intensities, small enough changes in relative factor prices produce a shift from one cone of
diversiﬁcation to another one, aﬀecting the pattern of production. Therefore, unless min(Fi) is too low, in
either equilibrium the domestic economy produces a commodity that is more capital-intensive than the one
produced in autarky.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
Foreign investment from high- to low-wage countries introduces pressures on domestic labor markets due
to technological advantages of foreign ﬁrms. Unless the low-wage country is small or capital abundant, its
technology gap is small or the ﬁxed costs of foreign investment are high −in which case there is no FDI in
equilibrium−, the access of technology-backward ﬁrms aﬀects the domestic labor market and the patterns
of comparative advantage. In particular, the domestic wage rate rises above its autarky level, rising the
relative cost of labor for domestic producers and shifting the domestic production structure toward a more
capital-intensive mix. The ﬁnal pattern of production will also depend upon the sectoral distribution of
foreign investment, that depends solely on the relative size of the ﬁxed cost of foreign investment.
A ﬁrst implication of the paper is that the likelihood of an equilibrium with foreign investment and labor
market pressures is higher when the domestic economy is able to provide the necessary scale of production
for foreign producers in order to compensate for the ﬁxed cost of foreign production. This is more likely
in large labor-abundant technology-backward countries or when the ﬁxed cost of foreign invested is low.
Once the conditions for positive FDI are satisﬁed, domestic wages rise above their autarky level, and the
equilibrium wage rate is higher in large labor-abundant economies or economies with high technology gap.
Interestingly, the conditions that determine that a country has low income per capita before capital and
technology ﬂows are allowed for −low productivity and a low capital-labor endowment ratio− are those that
enhance the possible gains of FDI inﬂows.
Also, the change in relative factor prices in the domestic economy shifts the pattern of domestic production
toward a more capital-intensive mix. As the domestic capital market remains segmented, wage increase
19depress the domestic return to capital, rising the relative cost of labor for domestic producers. Some
domestic factors must remain segmented from international competition if technology-backward ﬁrms are to
remain viable when technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms have access to domestic factor markets. In this case,
I have assumed that the capital market remains segmented, so its return adjusts downward to compensate
for domestic technology backwardness. If foreign producers had access to all factor markets in the economy,
technology-backward domestic producers cannot compete in any industry, and the paradigm of comparative
advantage vanishes as absolute technology diﬀerences become relevant. In general, FDI rises the relative
cost of the factor they have access to in the host economy, shifting the domestic production structure away
from the goods that use intensively that factor.
The idea that FDI can shift the production pattern of labor-abundant technology-backward countries
toward capital-intensive goods may have important welfare implications for the countries that are source of
FDI. Following Samuelson (2004), a shift toward production of capital-intensive goods by poor countries
−in this case not because they have access to the advanced country technology but rather in response to
the change in domestic relative factor prices following the arrival of technology-advanced foreign ﬁrms− can
have negative terms-of-trade eﬀects on capital-abundant countries.
This result contrasts with the traditional idea that global integration −through of the appearance into
the world economic system of large previously-closed labor-abundant countries− is associated with a fall in
the relative price of labor-intensive commodities and hence a positive terms-of-trade eﬀe c tf o rn e ti m p o r t e r s
of labor-intensive goods. The results in this paper suggest that the eﬀects of capital and technology ﬂows go
in the opposite direction. The increase in relative wages in the host technology-backward labor-abundant
country changes its pattern of comparative advantage toward capital-intensive goods. If this eﬀect is large
enough it generates a negative terms-of-trade eﬀect on capital-abundant technology-advanced countries. The
quantitative relevance of this mechanism requires further study, but it reveals that capital and technology
ﬂows have critical implications on production and trade patterns.
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Figure 2 
Residual Domestic Labor Supply for Foreign Firms consistent with 


































































Figure 3, Panel (a) 
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Figure 3, Panel (b) 












































































































Figure 5, Panel (a) 
Domestic Labor Market Equilibrium with Pre-Integration Domestic 
Specialization: Two-goods Case 
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Figure 5, Panel (b) 
Domestic Labor Market Equilibrium with Pre-Integration Domestic 
Specialization: Two-goods Case 
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Figure 5, Panel (c) 
Domestic Labor Market Equilibrium with Pre-Integration Domestic 
Specialization: Multiple-goods Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 